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E nergy and a changing climate
The world economy needs ever-increasing amounts of energy to sustain economic growth, 
raise living standards, and reduce poverty. But today’s trends in energy use are not sustain-
able. As the world’s population grows and economies become more industrialized, nonrenew-
able energy sources will become scarcer and more costly. And carbon dioxide emissions from 
the use of fossil fuels will continue to build in the atmosphere, accelerating global warming. 
Energy-related carbon dioxide now accounts for 61–65 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions (IEA 2008a; IPCC 2007a; WRI 2005). Global warming will have particularly perni-
cious effects for developing economies, with their high exposure and low adaptive capacity. 
Where energy comes from, how we produce it, and how much we use will profoundly affect 
development in the 21st century.
This introduction focuses on recent trends in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions—and 
projections through 2030. There is now a consensus that action is needed to curb the growth 
in human-made greenhouse-gas emissions (IPCC 2007b; IEA 2008a). A new post-2012 policy 
regime on global climate change—to be agreed in Copenhagen in late 2009—aims to set a 
quantified global goal for stabilizing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and to establish 
robust policy mechanisms that ensure the goal is achieved.
Without government initiatives on energy or climate change, global temperatures may rise 
as much as 6°C by the end of the century. This outcome of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change Trend Scenario can be compared with a 3°C rise under a Policy Scenario 
in which greenhouse gasses are stabilized at 550 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide 
equivalent and a 2°C rise under a Policy Scenario in which concentrations are stabilized at 
450 ppm. The consequences of the Trend Scenario go well beyond what the international 
community regards as acceptable.
The global financial and economic crisis, while reducing the demand for energy in the short 
run, may also slow efforts at energy saving by lowering the price of oil and other fossil energy 
sources. And by discouraging investments in fossil fuel substitutes and more energy- efficient 
production processes, the crisis may leave the world on a higher carbon dioxide emission 
path. The world’s largest economy and biggest contributor to carbon dioxide emissions has 
new leadership that could make climate change a top priority and commit resources to find-
ing alternative sources of cleaner energy.
Introduction
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particularly oil, make projections of energy demand diffi-
cult. The International Energy Agency forecasts that energy 
demand in 2030 will be 45 percent higher than energy use 
in 2006, for an average annual growth of 1.6 percent, or just 
a little slower than the 1.9 percent from 1980 to 2006 (IEA 
2008a, b). More than 80 percent of the energy used in 2006 
was from nonrenewable fuels—carbon dioxide–emitting oil, 
coal, and gas. In the absence of new policies this share is 
projected to remain above 80 percent in 2030, with demand 
for coal—cheaper and more abundant—growing faster than 
that for oil and gas (figure 3e and table 3f).
Growing 2 percent a year on average, world demand for 
coal is projected to be 60 percent higher in 2030 than in 
2006. Most of the increase in demand comes from the power 
generation sector. China and India together account for 85 
percent of this increase. Oil demand grows far more slowly 
than demand for other fossil fuels, mainly because of high 
final prices. Yet, oil remains the dominant fuel in the primary 
mix, even with the drop in its share from 34 percent in 2006 
to 30 percent in 2030.
Energy use: unsustainable trend, 
unacceptable future
In 2006 global energy use from all sources reached 11.5 bil-
lion metric tons of oil equivalent—twice as high as its 1971 
level (figure 3a). High-income economies, with just 15 per-
cent of world population, use almost half of global energy (fig-
ure 3b). Energy use grew by 2.4 percent a year in low-income 
economies, 2.0 percent in middle-income economies, and 
1.6 percent in high-income economies over 1990–2006. It 
rose 4.4 percent a year in China and 3.5 percent in India. The 
United States, Russian Federation, Germany, Japan, China, 
and India are the top energy consumers, accounting for 55 
percent of global energy use (figure 3c and table 3.7). On 
average, high-income economies use more than 11 times the 
energy per capita of low-income economies, with huge dif-
ferences across countries and within countries and regions 
(figure 3d).
The accelerating trend in energy use and the potential 
consequences have been matters of concern for the interna-
tional community. The recent global financial crisis, economic 
downturn, and significant fluctuations in the price of energy, 
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fields, which are typically smaller, more complex, and more 
costly to develop.
Despite the improved environment for emerging, climate-
friendly, renewable energy sources and technologies, many 
barriers remain. The costs of some technologies are high 
at their early stages, when economies of scale cannot be 
realized. Research and development were limited until the 
recent oil price rise. Concerns are growing about the impact 
on food supplies with more use of crops for energy. And there 
is skepticism about the net contribution of biofuels to lower 
greenhouse gas emissions (FAO 2008).
In many countries climate change has risen to the top of 
the political agenda—the result of a growing body of evidence 
on global warming and ever more startling predictions of the 
ecological consequences (IPCC 2007b). The commitment of 
the new U.S. administration to containing the impact of global 
climate change and the changing attitudes toward wind and 
solar energy offer promise of reducing the carbon footprint of 
energy use.
Uncertain supply
It is not going to be easy to meet the expected growth in 
energy demand, particularly for oil, despite seemingly large 
available reserves (table 3g). Based on a field by field analy-
sis of production trends, the cost of investment, opportu-
nities for expanding capacity, and possible constraints and 
risks—both above and below ground—the International 
Energy Agency has drawn attention to the possibility of an 
oil-supply crunch by the middle of the 2010s, if upstream 
investments fall short of requirements. A growing number of 
oil companies and analysts have suggested that oil produc-
tion may peak within the next two decades, a result of ris-
ing costs, political and geological factors, and limits on the 
investment that can be mobilized (IEA 2008a). The rate of 
decline in production from existing fields—especially large, 
mature fields that have been the mainstay of global output 
for several decades—has been faster than anticipated (fig-
ure 3h). How output from these fields evolves—with or with-
out the deployment of enhanced recovery techniques—will 
have major implications for the  required investment in new 
Fuel 1980 2006 2030
Annual growth, 
2006–30 (%)
Total (million metric 
tons oil equivalent) 7,224 11,730 17,014 1.6
Share (% of total)
Coal 24.8 26.0 28.8 2.0
Oil 43.0 34.3 30.0 1.0
Gas 17.1 20.5 21.6 1.8
Nuclear 2.6 6.2 5.3 0.9
Hydropower 2.0 2.2 2.4 1.9
Biomass and waste 10.4 10.1 9.8 1.4
Other renewables 0.2 0.6 2.1 7.2
Source: IEA 2008a.
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Country
Oil reserves  
(billions of barrels)
Share of world 
total (%)
Saudi Arabia 264.3 20.4
Canada 178.9 13.8
Iran 132.5 10.3
Iraq 115.0 8.9
Kuwait 101.5 7.9
United Arab Emirates 97.8 7.6
Venezuela, RB 79.7 6.2
Russian Federation 60.0 4.6
Rest of the world 262.8 20.3
Total 1,292.5
Source: Deutch, Lauvergeon, and Prawiraatmadja 2007.
Known global oil reserves and countries  
with highest endowments in 2006 3g
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again cause emissions growth to fall below the rate of growth 
of primary energy use (figure 3j). But as the world becomes 
wealthier, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions continue 
to rise in absolute terms.
World carbon dioxide emissions per capita fell until around 
2000, but have since risen rapidly. In the absence of new 
policies, this upward trend is projected to continue through 
2030. Government policies, including those to address cli-
mate change, air pollution, and energy security, have slowed 
the growth in emissions in some countries. But in most, 
emissions are still rising fast. In 2005 per capita emissions 
were greatest in the United States, followed by the Russian 
Federation, Japan, and Germany (table 3.8 and figure 3k). 
China’s per capita emissions were 4.3 tons—close to the 
global average and about one-third of the level of high-income 
economies (figure 3l)—while India’s were 1.3 tons.
Carbon dioxide emissions are attributed to the country 
or region consuming the fossil fuel. Yet the consumption 
benefits from the goods and services produced using the 
fossil fuel are often realized in a country other than that in 
which the emissions arise. This concerns some emerging 
market economies, which tend to be more export-oriented, 
Energy and climate change
Economic activity, energy use, and carbon dioxide emissions 
move together (figure 3i). The world is already experiencing 
the impact of rising average global temperature on physical 
and biological systems, and the situation is worsening. The 
13 warmest years since 1880 have occurred in the last 16 
years (IPCC 2007a; Rosenzweig and others 2008). There is a 
risk of reaching unpredictable tipping points, such as a rise in 
Arctic temperatures precipitating a massive release of meth-
ane from permafrost zones. Thawing permafrost could also 
threaten oil and gas extraction infrastructure and pipeline 
stability.
Current carbon dioxide levels
In the 1980s global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 
(up 1.7 percent annually) rose more slowly than primary en-
ergy demand (up 1.9 percent annually), mainly because the 
shares of natural gas, nuclear power, and renewables in the 
power mix expanded. But this decarbonization of energy 
reversed at the beginning of the 21st century as the share 
of nuclear energy fell while that of coal rose. In the Trend 
Scenario recarbonization of the energy sector is projected 
to continue until after 2020, when changing supply patterns 
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In the Trend Scenario rising global use of fossil energy 
continues to drive up energy-related carbon dioxide emis-
sions over at least the next two decades. Emissions grew by 
2.5 gigatons from 1990 to 2000, when their growth acceler-
ated, and increased a further 4.5 gigatons to 28 gigatons by 
2006. They are projected to increase a further 45 percent by 
2030, approaching 41 gigatons in the Trend Scenario. This 
acceleration in carbon dioxide emissions calls for urgent sta-
bilization measures.
There is not yet an international consensus on long-
term stabilization targets. Most discussions center on sta-
bilization levels between 450 ppm and 550 ppm of carbon 
dioxide equivalent and their consequences (table 3n and fig-
ure 3o; IPCC 2007). The required reduction in energy-related 
emissions varies with level of international participation by 
economies sorted by income groups. In both the 450 ppm 
and 550 ppm Policy Scenarios, even after allowing for inter-
national emissions trading and active engagement by non– 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, International Energy Agency projections 
show that OECD countries would have to substantially reduce 
emissions domestically (IEA 2008a).
Energy and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are embedded 
in imports as well as exports, and some goods and services are 
more emissions-intensive than others. There are ways of calculating 
the emissions embedded in international trade, none of them fully 
accurate because of the lack of complete, reliable, and up-to-date 
data. A detailed input-output analysis for China reveals the complex-
ity, involving calculating carbon intensity all along the production 
chain and across the economy, including outsourcing (IEA 2007; 
Houser and others 2008).
At the global level the percentage of exports in GDP can be used 
as a simple proxy for the share of energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions embedded in domestic production for export. The coun-
tries for which up-to-date trade data are available represent 83 
percent of total world energy-related carbon dioxide emissions (IEA 
2008a). The International Energy Agency estimate of the share of 
emissions embedded in exports in 2006 ranges from 15 percent 
for North America to 48 percent for the Middle East. The differ-
ence reflects variations in the amount and type of exports and the 
carbon intensity of energy use. The shares for China (44 percent) 
and Asian countries other than China and India (41 percent) are 
next highest. Of the 23 gigatons of energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions in the International Energy Agency sample, one-third 
were embedded in production for export. China alone accounted 
for 2.3 gigatons (31 percent) of this, and Europe and the Russian 
Federation combined for another 1.7 gigatons (23 percent). Africa 
and Latin America each accounted for just 2 percent of embedded 
emissions (IEA 2008a).
Carbon dioxide emissions  
embedded in international trade 3m
with energy-intensive manufactured exports. A detailed input-
output analysis in China tracked the distribution of fuels, 
raw materials, and intermediate goods to and from indus-
tries throughout the economy. Taking carbon intensities and 
trade data into account, it estimated the energy-related car-
bon dioxide emissions embedded in domestic production for 
export at 34 percent of its 2004 emissions (IEA 2007). With 
China’s production facilities expanding rapidly, the figures for 
later years could be higher (box 3m).
Trend and Policy Scenarios
Annual greenhouse gas emissions are projected to grow 
from 44 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2005 to 
60 gigatons in 2030, a 35 percent increase. The share of 
energy- related carbon dioxide emissions in total emissions is 
forecast to increase from 61 percent in 2005 to 68 percent 
in 2030 (IEA 2008a). With emissions of greenhouse gases 
building in the atmosphere faster than natural processes can 
remove them, concentrations rise. The Trend Scenario puts 
us on a path to doubling aggregate concentrations by the end 
of the century, increasing global average temperatures up to 
6°C (IPCC 2007a; IEA 2008a).
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in 2030.
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and other industrial facilities, but it has not yet been 
deployed on a significant scale (IEA 2008a). The basic 
technology already exists to capture carbon dioxide 
gas and transport and store it permanently in geologi-
cal formations. Four large-scale carbon capture and 
storage projects are operating around the world, each 
separating around 1 megaton of carbon dioxide per 
year from produced natural gas: Sleipner and Snohvit 
in Norway, Weyburn in Canada (with the carbon diox-
ide sourced in the United States), and In Salah in 
Algeria. Yet there are technical, economic, and legal 
barriers to more widespread deployment, particularly 
high energy intensity and the cost.
Second-generation biofuels.??  New biofuel  technologies 
—notably hydrolysis and gasification of woody ligno-
cellulosic feedstock to produce ethanol—are expected 
to reach commercialization by around 2020. Although 
the technology already exists, experts believe that 
more research is needed to improve process efficien-
cies. There is virtually no commercial production of 
ethanol yet from cellulosic biomass, but several OECD 
countries are researching it. A recent Food and Agri-
culture Organization report is skeptical about the net 
contribution of biofuels to reduction of greenhouse 
gasses and blames biofuels production for last year’s 
large food price increases (FAO 2008).
Coal-to-liquids.??  The conversion of coal to oil products 
through gasification and synthesis—much like gas to 
liquid production—has been done commercially for 
many decades. Yet global production remains limited 
because it has been uneconomical, mainly because 
of the large amounts of energy and water used in the 
process, the high cost of building plants, and the vola-
tility of oil and coal prices.
Need for cleaner, more efﬁcient energy
Adequate energy supplies are required for economies to 
grow and poverty to be reduced, but the current reliance on 
fossil fuels is not sustainable. Transitioning to new energy 
sources poses a significant challenge to all economies. Hu-
manity’s future on this planet may depend on finding ways to 
supply the world’s growing energy needs without irreparably 
harming the environment. This could be achieved through 
new energy technologies, greater energy efficiency, and al-
ternative renewable sources that provide a low-carbon path 
to growth.
For the low-carbon growth needed to stabilize carbon 
dioxide emissions, technological innovations are crucial. 
Because much of today’s energy-using capital stock will be 
replaced only gradually, it will take time before most of the 
impact of recent and future technological developments that 
improve energy efficiency are felt. Rates of capital-stock turn-
over differ greatly by industry and sector. Most of today’s 
cars, trucks, heating and cooling systems, and industrial 
boilers will be replaced by 2030. But most buildings, roads, 
railways, and airports and many power stations and refiner-
ies will still be in use unless governments encourage or force 
early retirement. Despite the slow turnover, refurbishment in 
some cases could significantly improve energy efficiency at 
an acceptable net economic cost.
On the supply side technological advances can improve 
the technical and economic efficiency of producing and sup-
plying energy. In some cases they are expected to reduce 
unit costs and to lead to new and cleaner ways of producing 
and delivering energy services. Some major new supply-side 
technologies that are approaching commercialization are 
expected to become available to some degree before 2030 
(IEA 2008a).
Carbon capture and storage.??  This technology miti-
gates emissions of carbon dioxide from power plants 
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Biomass, geothermal, and solar thermal met around ??
6 percent of global heating demand in 2006, a 
share projected to rise to 7 percent by 2030. Where 
resources are abundant and conventional energy 
sources expensive, renewables-based heating can be 
cost competitive with conventional heating systems.
The share of biofuels in road transport fuels world-??
wide is projected to rise from 1.5 percent in 2006 
to 5 percent in 2030, spurred by subsidies and high 
oil prices. Most of the growth comes from the United 
States, European Union, China, and Brazil.
The cost of power generation from renewables is expected to 
fall. Greater deployment spurs technological progress and in-
creases economies of scale, lowering investment costs. The 
costs of the more mature technologies, including geothermal 
and onshore wind, are assumed to fall least. Renewables ac-
count for just under half of the total projected investment in 
electricity generation. The cost of stabilizing carbon dioxide 
is significant, but there are also significant savings (box 3s). 
And the cost of inaction would be far higher.
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Energy efﬁciency
In recent years there has been an encouraging trend in pro-
ducing more from each unit of energy (figure 3p), a powerful 
and cost-effective way to get on the path to a sustainable 
energy future. Greater energy efficiency can reduce the need 
for investing in energy infrastructure, cut fuel costs, increase 
competitiveness, and improve consumer welfare. And by re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution, it can be 
good for the environment. The International Energy Agency 
estimates that implementing a host of 25 policy recommen-
dations for promoting energy efficiency could reduce annual 
carbon dioxide emissions 8.2 gigatons by 2030—equivalent 
to one-fifth of global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 
in the Trend Scenario (IEA 2008b). The recommendations 
cover policies and technologies for buildings, appliances, 
transport, and industry as well as end-use applications such 
as lighting.
Renewable energy
The share of renewables in global primary energy demand, 
excluding traditional biomass, is projected to climb from 
7 percent in 2006 to 10 percent by 2030 in the Trend Sce-
nario (IEA 2008a). This assumes that costs come down as 
renewable technologies mature, that higher fossil fuel prices 
make renewables more competitive, and that policy support 
is strong. The renewables industry could eliminate its reli-
ance on subsidies and bring emerging technologies into the 
mainstream.
World renewables-based electricity generation—??
mostly hydro and wind power—is projected to more 
than double by 2030 (figure 3q).
Many countries have already begun exploiting wind to ??
generate electricity (figure 3r). Global wind power is 
projected to increase 11-fold, becoming the second 
largest source renewable after hydropower by 2030.
The 550 parts per million (ppm) Policy Scenario requires spend-
ing $4.1 trillion more on energy efficiency and power plants and 
reducing consumption of fossil fuels by 22 gigatons of oil equivalent 
over 2010–30 through more efficient energy use. The International 
Energy Agency estimates that the net undiscounted savings in the 
550 ppm Policy Scenario, compared with the Trend Scenario, amount 
to more than $4 trillion.
The 450 ppm Policy Scenario requires additional investment of $3.6 
trillion in power plants and $5.7 trillion in energy efficiency over 2010–
30 relative to the Trend Scenario. This additional investment is much 
higher in 2021–30 than in 2010–20 (see figure). In the 450 ppm Policy 
Scenario substantially higher investment is needed in power plants. 
Also, investment in energy efficiency rises considerably, particularly 
beyond 2020. During that period improving energy efficiency in build-
ings will require the highest investment. In the 450 ppm Policy Scenario 
the additional investment in power plants and demand-side efficiency 
corresponds to 0.55 percent of cumulative world GDP over 2010–30, 
compared with 0.24 percent in the 550 ppm Policy Scenario.
Source: IEA 2008a.
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